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Abstract. The growing availability of hardware-based trusted execu-
tion environments (TEEs) in commodity processors has recently ad-
vanced support (i.e., design, implementation and deployment frame-
works) for network-based secure services. Examples of such TEEs in-
clude Arm TrustZone or Intel SGX, largely available in embedded,
mobile and server-grade processors. TEEs shield services from compro-
mised hosts, malicious users or powerful attackers. TEE-enabled devices
are largely being deployed on the edge of the network, paving the way
for large-scale deployments of trusted applications. These applications al-
low processing and disseminating sensitive data without having to trust
cloud providers. However, uncovering network performance limitations
of such trusted applications is difficult and currently lacking, despite the
interest and reliance by developers and system deployers.
iperfTZ is an open-source tool to uncover network performance bottle-
necks rooted at the design and implementation of trusted applications
for Arm TrustZone and underlying runtime systems. Our evaluation
based on micro-benchmarks shows current trade-offs for trusted appli-
cations, both from a network as well as an energy perspective; an often
overlooked yet relevant aspect for edge-based deployments.
Keywords: network, performance, bottleneck, measurement, ARMTrust-
Zone, OP-TEE
1 Introduction
Services are being moved from the cloud to the edge of the network. This mi-
gration is due to several reasons: lack of trust on the cloud provider [7], energy
savings [17,22] or willing to reclaim control over data and code. Edge devices are
used to accumulate, process and stream data [18, 28]. The nature of such data
can be potentially very sensitive: edge devices can be used to process health-
based data emitted by body sensors (e.g., cardiac data [24]), data originated
by smart home sensors indicating the presence or absence of humans inside a
household, or even financial transactions [15, 26]. In this context, applications
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using this information must be protected against powerful attackers, potentially
even with physical access to the devices. Additionally, communication channels
for inter-edge device applications must also be secured to prevent attacks such
as man-in-the-middle attacks. Edge devices are typically low-energy units with
limited processing and storage capacity. As such, it is unpractical to rely on
sophisticated software-based protection mechanisms (e.g., homomorphic encryp-
tion [20]), currently due to their high processing requirements and low perfor-
mance [12]. Alternatively, new hardware-based protection mechanisms can be
easily leveraged by programmers to provide the mentioned protection guaran-
tees. Specifically, trusted execution environments (TEEs) are increasingly made
available by hardware vendors in edge-devices [27]. Several Arm-based devices,
such as the popular Raspberry Pi1, embed native support for TrustZone [4,21],
Arm’s specific design for TEEs. TrustZone can be leveraged to deploy trusted
applications (TAs) with additional security guarantees. There exist several pro-
gramming frameworks and runtime systems to develop TAs forTrustZone with
varying capabilities and different degrees of stability and support (e.g., Sierra-
TEE2, Op-Tee3, and [19]). While few studies look at the interaction between
TEEs and the corresponding untrusted execution environments [2, 14], little is
known on the network performance bottlenecks experienced by TAs on Arm pro-
cessors. We fill this gap by contributing iperfTZ, a tool to measure accurately
the network performance (e.g., latency, throughput) of TAs for TrustZone.
iperfTZ consists of three components, namely (1) a client application, (2) a
TA, and (3) a server. Our tool can be used to guide the calibration of TAs for
demanding workloads, for instance understanding the exchanges with untrusted
applications or for secure inter-TEE applications [26]. In addition, iperfTZ can
be used to study the impact of network and memory performance on the en-
ergy consumption of running TAs. By adjusting iperfTZ’s parameters, users
evaluate the network throughput of their TAs and can quickly uncover potential
bottlenecks early in the development cycle. For instance, internal buffer sizes af-
fect the achievable network throughput rates by a factor of 1.8×, almost halving
throughput rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the need for
tools analyzing TAs. We provide an in-depth background on TrustZone in Sec-
tion 3, as well as covering details on the TrustZone runtime system Op-Tee.
In Section 4 we present the architecture of iperfTZ and some implementation
details in Section 5. We report our evaluation results in Section 6. We cover
related work in Section 7 before concluding in Section 8.
1 https://www.raspberrypi.org, accessed on 30.07.2019
2 https://www.sierraware.com/open-source-ARM-TrustZone.html, accessed on
30.07.2019
3 https://www.op-tee.org, accessed on 30.07.2019
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Fig. 1: Block diagrams highlighting relevant software components.
2 Motivating Scenario
We consider scenarios with simple yet practical services deployed as TAs. For
instance, in [13] authors deploy key-value stores inside a TrustZone runtime
system. Benchmarks show a 12×-17× slowdown when compared to plain (yet
unsecure) deployments, due to shared memory mechanisms between the trusted
and untrusted environments. As further detailed in Section 4, networking in Op-
Tee is supported by similar shared memory mechanisms. Yet, we observe the
lack of tools to clearly highlight the root causes of such bottlenecks. Further,
in the TrustZone ecosystem, there is a lack of proper tools to evaluate net-
work bottlenecks contrary to untrusted environments (e.g., iperf34, netperf5,
nuttcp6). The overhead originating from the shared memory mechanism can be
identified by comparing the measured network throughput inside and outside the
TEE. Measuring such overheads is of particular relevance in embedded, mobile
and IoT environments. In those scenarios, devices are often battery powered,
limited both in time and capacity. Hence, network performance tools should
further highlight energy costs, pointing users to specific bottlenecks.
3 Background
This section provides a background on Arm TrustZone (Section 3.1), the
GlobalPlatform specifications (Section 3.2) and Op-Tee, the TrustZone
runtime system used for iperfTZ (Section 3.3). This background helps under-
standing technical challenges in our context and how iperfTZ addresses them.
3.1 ARM TrustZone in a Nutshell
TrustZone is a security architecture designed for Arm processors and was
introduced in 2003 [3]. It partitions hardware and software resources into two
4 https://software.es.net/iperf/, accessed on 30.07.2019
5 https://hewlettpackard.github.io/netperf/, accessed on 30.07.2019
6 https://www.nuttcp.net/Welcome%20Page.html, accessed on 30.07.2019
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worlds, i.e., secure and normal world, as shown in Fig. 1a. A dedicated NS
bit [4] drives this world separation and allows to execute secure (NS bit set low)
or non-secure (NS bit set high) transactions on the system bus. In general, non-
secure transactions cannot access system resource secured by a low NS bit. The
TrustZone architecture spans beyond the system bus, including peripherals
(e.g., GPUs [29] and I/O). Every TrustZone-enabled processor is logically split
into a secure and a non-secure (virtual) core, executing in a time-shared manner.
Hence, accessible system resources are determined by the executing core: secure
cores can access all system resources, while non-secure cores can only access non-
secure ones. Arm processors embed one memory management unit (MMU) per
virtual core in charge of mapping virtual addresses to physical addresses. The
translation lookaside buffer (TLB) in the MMU is used to maintain the mapping
translations from virtual to physical memory addresses. Tagging TLB entries
with the identity of the world allows secure and non-secure address translation
entries to co-exist. With tags the TLB no longer has to be flushed making fast
world switches possible.
The implementation of TrustZone is organized into four exception levels
(EL) with increasing privileges [5] (Fig. 1a). EL0, the lowest one, executes un-
privileged software. EL1 executes operating systems, while EL2 provides support
for virtualization. Finally, Arm Trusted Firmware is running at EL3 dispatching
boot stages at boot time and monitoring secure states. Switches between the two
worlds are supervised by a secure monitor [6]. It is invoked in two ways: (1) by
executing a secure monitor call (SMC), or (2) by a subset of hardware exception
mechanisms [4]. When invoked, the secure monitor saves the state of the cur-
rently executing world, before restoring the state of the world being switched to.
After dealing with the worlds’ state, the secure monitor returns from exception
to the restored world.
3.2 The GlobalPlatform Standard
GlobalPlatform7 publishes specifications for several TEEs (e.g., Op-Tee
and [19]). We provide more details on Op-Tee in Section 3.3 (an implemen-
tation of such specifications), while briefly explaining the terminology in the
remainder to understand Fig. 1b. An execution environment (EE) provides all
components to execute applications, including hardware and software compo-
nents. A rich execution environment (REE) runs a rich OS, generally designed
for performance. However, it lacks access to any secure component. In contrast,
TEEs are designed for security, but programmers have to rely on a reduced set of
features. A trusted OS manages the TEE under constrained memory and storage
bounds. TEE and REE run alongside each other. In recent Arm releases (since
v8.4), multiple TEEs can execute in parallel [3], each with their own trusted
OS. TAs rely on system calls implemented by the trusted OS, typically imple-
mented as specific APIs [10]. Client applications (CA) running in the rich OS
can communicate with TAs using the TEE Client API. Similarly, TAs can access
7 https://globalplatform.org, accessed on 30.07.2019
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resources such as secure elements (i.e., tamper-resistant devices), trusted stor-
age, and peripherals, or send messages outside the TEE. Communication agents
in the TEE and REE mediate exchanges between TAs and CAs. Finally, the
TEE Socket API can be used by TAs to setup network connections with remote
CAs and TAs.
3.3 Op-Tee: Open Portable Trusted Execution Environment
Op-Tee is an open-source implementation of several GlobalPlatform speci-
fications [8–11] with native support for TrustZone. The Op-Tee OS manages
the TEE resources, while any Linux-based distribution can be used as rich OS
alongside it. Op-Tee supports two types of TAs: (1) regular TAs [11] running
at EL0, and (2) pseudo TAs (PTAs), statically linked against the Op-Tee OS
kernel. PTAs run at EL1 as secure privileged-level services inside Op-Tee OS’s
kernel. Finally, Op-Tee provides a set of client libraries to interact with TAs
and to access secure system resources from within the TEE.
4 Networking for Trusted Applications
The application in the REE acts as a proxy interface to the TA forwarding ar-
guments. First, the application creates a context (TEEC_InitializeContext).
Then, it allocates dynamic shared-memory areas (TEEC_AllocateSharedMemory),
basically used as buffer between the secure and normal worlds, as well as forward
function arguments, piggybacked upon the session creation (TEEC_OpenSession).
Functions in the TA can be used through TEEC_InvokeCommand calls. Once the
session is closed (TEEC_CloseSession), the shared-memory areas can be released
from the context and freed before finalizing the context.
For networked TAs, i.e., generating or receiving network traffic respectively
from and to TAs, runtime systems must provide support for sockets and corre-
sponding APIs. To do so, either (1) the TEE borrows the network stack from
the REE, or (2) the TEE relies on trusted device drivers. The former solution
implies leveraging remote procedure calls (RPC) to a tee-supplicant (an agent
which responds to requests from the TEE), and achieves a much smaller trusted
computing base. The latter allows for direct access to the network device drivers
for much lower network latencies. Furthermore, it simplifies confidential data
handling as the data does not have to leave the TEE. The former requires de-
velopers to provide data confidentiality before network packets leave the TEE,
for instance by relying on encryption.
iperfTZ leverages libutee8 and its socket API, supporting streams or data-
grams. The socket interface exposes common functions: open, send, recv, close,
ioctl and error. The GlobalPlatform specification allows TEE implemen-
tations to extend protocol-specific functionalities via command codes and ioctl
8 https://optee.readthedocs.io/architecture/libraries.html#libutee, ac-
cessed on 30.07.2019
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functions. For example, it is possible to adjust the receiving and sending socket
buffer sizes with TCP socket or changing the address and port with UDP sockets.
The libutee library manages the lifecycle of sockets via a TA session to
the socket’s PTA. The socket PTA handles the RPC to the tee-supplicant,
in particular allocating the RPC parameters and assigning their values. After-
wards, a SMC instruction is executed to switch back to the normal world. The
tee-supplicant constantly checks for new service requests from the TEE. Once
a new request arrives, its arguments are read by the tee-supplicant and the
specified command is being executed. Finally, when the data is received by the
tee-supplicant, it is relayed over Posix sockets to the rich OS. In essence,
when data is sent or received over a socket, it traverses all exception levels, both
secure (from EL0 up to EL3) and non-secure (from EL2 to EL0 and back up).
Fig. 2 summarizes the previous paragraphs and shows the interaction between
the secure and normal worlds in Op-Tee. The secure world hosts the TA, which
interacts directly with libutee (Fig. 2-Ê). When using GlobalPlatform’s
Socket API, libutee does a system call (Fig. 2-Ë) to Op-Tee. Op-Tee then
delegates the request to the socket PTA (Fig. 2-Ì). The secure monitor is invoked
through a SMC (Fig. 2-Í), which maps the data from the TEE to the REE’s
address space. From there execution switches into the normal world and the
Op-Tee driver (Fig. 2-Î) resumes operation. Requests are then handled by
the tee-supplicant (Fig. 2-Ï) over ioctl system calls. The agent executes
system calls using libc (Fig. 2-Ð) to directly relate the underlying network
driver (Fig. 2-Ñ) over the Posix interface. Once data reaches the network driver,
it can be sent over the wire (Fig. 2-Ò).
4.1 Threat Model
For our threat model we consider a malicious user that has physical access or
is capable to obtain remote access on the devices used to deploy iperfTZ as
depicted in Fig. 3. By gaining access to the devices or the network the devices
are connected to, the malicious user has either the intention to compromise these
devices or to exploit iperfTZ for denial-of-service attacks. We assume that the
REE, which includes the rich OS and the user space, cannot be trusted. However,
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we assume that the devices and the TEE, which includes bootloader, Op-Tee,
and secure monitor, can be trusted. As also stated in [4], side-channel attacks
are out of scope of our threat model.
Assuming our TrustZone-enabled device is equipped with an embedded
MultiMediaCard (eMMC), then TAs can be securely stored on the eMMC and
the malicious user cannot tamper with a TA’s binary. Otherwise, the malicious
user who has gained control over the REE, has access to the TAs and can ma-
nipulate a TA’s binary and compromise iperfTZ. Manipulation of the CA’s
parameters by the malicious user to trigger a buffer overflow can be excluded.
In iperfTZ, buffer allocation and initialization use the same variable as size
indicator. Hence, the TA will return an out of memory error code, if it tries to
allocate more memory than it is allowed to use. During a network bandwidth
measurement, the malicious user can run a (distributed) denial-of-service attack
to reduce the network bandwidth, such that a lower network throughput is mea-
sured and reported by iperfTZ. Although irrelevant to iperfTZ, the malicious
user could run a man-in-the-middle attack, either directly within the REE or on
the network, and intercept the traffic exchanged between the two devices. At the
time of writing, Op-Tee does not provide support for the TLS protocol which
renders secure connections unusable.
5 Implementation
We describe the implementation challenges of the three components included in
iperfTZ,9 namely (1) a CA acting as proxy for iperfTZ’s (2) TA, and (3) the
server component which the TA is interfacing. All components are implemented
in the C language, and consists of 927 lines of code: 243 for the client, 314 for
iperfTZ’s TA, and 430 for the server.10
5.1 iperfTZ: Client Application
When the CA starts, the TEE context is initialized using the file descriptor
fetched from the Op-Tee driver. Two distinct dynamic shared-memory areas
are allocated at this time, to (1) exchange arguments passed over the command
line interface with the TA (see Section 5.2) and (2) to retrieve metrics gathered
by the TA during the network measurement. Several arguments (e.g., IP of the
target server node, dummy data size, socket buffer size) are written in the shared
memory area. The dummy data size is used by the TA to read/write data to the
interface socket. Both shared memory areas get registered with the operation
data structure before calling the TEEC_InvokeCommand function. The executing
thread in the CA is blocked until the TA completes. The execution inside the
TEE is resumed at the TA’s main entry point upon world switch. Once the
TA completes, an SMC instruction drives the CPU core to switch back into the
normal world, where execution is resumed. The metrics gathered from the TA
are available to the user as persistent files.
9 https://github.com/ChrisG55/iperfTZ
10 Numbers for individual components include local header lines of code.
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5.2 iperfTZ: Trusted Application
The iperfTZ TA is the primary executing unit. It takes the role of the client
in the client-server model. The TA allocates a buffer for the dummy data on the
heap, filled with random data generated by Op-Tee’s Cryptographic Operations
API [10]. With the information from the arguments, the TA finally sets up a
TCP interface socket and opens a client connection before assigning the socket
buffer sizes. Our implementation relies on the Time API [10] to measure the
elapsed time during the network throughput measurement inside the TEE. Op-
Tee computes the time value from the physical count register and the frequency
register. The count register is a single instance register shared between normal
and secure world EL1. The network throughput measurement is then started
while either maintaining a constant bit rate, transmitting a specific number of
bytes or running for 10 seconds. During the measurement, the TA gathers metrics
on the number of transmit calls, i.e., recv and send, bytes sent, time spent in
the transmit calls and the total runtime. Upon completion, results are written to
the shared memory area and the execution switches back to the normal world.
5.3 iperfTZ: Server
The server component is deployed and executed inside the normal world. This is
used to wait for incoming TCP connections (or inbound UDP datagrams) from
iperfTZ’s TA. While executing, it gathers similar network metrics as the other
components. Additionally, this component collects TCP specific metrics, such as
the smoothed round trip time or the maximum segment size. This TCP specific
data is not accessible for TAs and can only be retrieved on the server side using
a getsockopt system call.
6 Evaluation
In this section we will demonstrate how iperfTZ can measure the network
throughput. We further draw conclusions regarding hardware and software im-
plementation designs. We report that it is particularly challenging to assess net-
work throughput, given the remarkable diversity one can find on embedded and
mobile Arm systems.
Evaluation settings. We deploy iperfTZ on the Raspberry Pi platform.
Due to the limited network bandwidth of Raspberry Pi devices supported by
Op-Tee, we also include results under emulation using QEMU.11 With QEMU
we can run the same evaluation as on the Raspberry Pi and we also profit
from a higher network bandwidth. Table 1 compares in detail the two setups.
For both setups we use the same machine as server, on which we collect power
consumptions and run the iperfTZ server component.
Server. The server is connected to a Gigabit switched network, with access to
power meter measurements. The nodes being measured are at a single-hop from
11 https://www.qemu.org, accessed on 30.07.2019
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Table 1: Comparison of evaluation platforms.
Device QEMU Raspberry
CPU Model Intel Xeon E3-1270 v6 Broadcom BCM2837
CPU Frequency 3.8GHz 1.2GHz
Memory Size 63GiB DDR4 944MiB LPDDR2
Memory data rate 2400MT/s 800MT/s
Samsung Transcend micro SDHCDisk Model MZ7KM480HMHQ0D3 UHI-I Premium
Disk Size 480GB 16GB
Disk Read Speed 528.33MB/s 90MB/s
Network Bandwidth 1Gbit/s 100Mbit/s
the server. During the micro-benchmarks server components will be deployed
on the server with fixed dummy buffer and socket buffer sizes of 128KiB. This
allows creating an accurate time series of the recorded throughput, latency and
power metrics by concentrating the data acquisition on a single node.
QEMU. We deploy Op-Tee with QEMU v3.1.0-rc3 running on a Dell Pow-
erEdge R330 server. The Op-Tee project has built-in support for QEMU and
uses it in system emulation mode. In system emulation mode QEMU emulates
an entire machine, dynamically translating different hardware instruction sets
when running a virtual machine with a different architecture. In order to provide
full network capability, we replace the default SLiRP network12 deployed with
Op-Tee by a bridged network with a tap device.
Raspberry Pi. Op-Tee only supports the Raspberry Pi 3B. We deploy
Op-Tee on a Raspberry Pi 3B v1.2 equipped with a Broadcom BCM2837 SoC.
The SoC implements an ARM Cortex-A53 with ARMv8-A architecture. The
BCM2837 chip lacks support for cryptographic acceleration instructions and
is not equipped with TrustZone Protection Controller (TZPC), TrustZone
Address Space Controller (TZASC), Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC) or any
other proprietary security control interfaces on the bus [25]. The Raspberry Pi
3B lacks an on-chip memory or eMMC to provide a securable memory. We take
these limitations into account in our evaluation, and leave further considerations
once a more mature support for the Raspberry Pi platform is released.
Power masurement. To measure the power consumption of the two plat-
forms, we connect the Dell PowerEdge server to a LINDY iPower Control 2x6M
power distribution unit (PDU) [16] and the Raspberry Pi 3B to an Alciom Pow-
erSpy2 [1]. The LINDY PDU provides a HTTP interface queried up to every
second with a resolution of 1 W and a precision of 1.5%. Alciom PowerSpy2
devices rely on Bluetooth channels to transfer the collected metrics. Both mea-
suring devices collect voltage, current and power consumption in real time.
Memory Bandwidth. We use an existing key-value store TA [13] to eval-
uate the overhead of the different types of shared memory. The hash-table at
the core of the key-value store uses separate chaining for collision resolution
12 https://wiki.qemu.org/Documentation/Networking#User_Networking_
.28SLIRP.29, accessed on 30.07.2019
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Fig. 4: Throughput-latency plots for different kinds of shared memory.
and implements modular hashing. The GlobalPlatform specification defines
three different types of shared memory: whole (an entire memory area), partial
(a subset of an entire memory area with a specified offset), and temporarily (a
memory area within the REE with an optional offset). The temporarily shared
memory area is only shared with the TA for the duration of the TEE method
invocation; the two others get registered and unregistered with the TEE session.
The key-value store supports common operations such as DEL, GET and PUT on
key-value pairs. We benchmark each operation in isolation as well as combining
GET and PUT operations (MIXed benchmark). The benchmarks operate as follows:
for whole and partially shared memory, the CA will request a shared memory re-
gion of 512KiB from the TEE and fills it with random data from /dev/urandom.
With temporarily shared memory, the CA will allocate a 512KiB buffer and ini-
tialize it similarly with random data. Before invoking a key-value operation a
chunk size of 1KiB is selected as data object at a random offset in the shared
memory respectively buffer. The random offset is then used as key and every
operation is timed using CLOCK_MONOTONIC.13 During the benchmark 256 opera-
tions are issued at a fixed rate between 1 and 32768 operations per second. Fig. 4
shows the throughput-latency plots for each type of shared memory as well as
for running the key-value store as a CA in the REE.
Compared to the Raspberry Pi, the results on QEMU are predominantly
superposed and only achieve about half the throughput. We believe this is due
to an I/O bound from the Arm instruction and TrustZone emulation using
QEMU. We further observe with QEMU that the DEL benchmark for temporar-
ily shared memory (Fig. 4b) and as CA (Fig. 4d) is clearly distinguishable from
the other benchmarks. On the Raspberry Pi platform the graphs are well sepa-
13 Manual page: man time.h
iperfTZ: Understanding Network Bottlenecks for TrustZone 11
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
Throughput [Mbit/s]
La
te
nc
y 
[s
]
■■■ ■ ■ ■ ■
■
■
▲▲▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
▲
▲iperf3  ■ iperfTZ  ▲
(a) Raspberry Pi
0 200 400 600
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Throughput [Mbit/s]
La
te
nc
y 
[s
]
■■■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
■
■
■
▲▲▲▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
▲
▲
iperf3  ■ iperfTZ  ▲
(b) QEMU
Fig. 5: TCP network throughput measurements for 128KiB buffer sizes.
rated and ranked according to our expectations (lowest to highest throughput):
PUT, MIX50, MIX20, GET, and DEL. The PUT operation has the lowest throughput
because of memory allocation, memory copy and object insertion in the TA. The
GET operation looks up the data object and copies it to the shared memory result-
ing in a higher throughput than the PUT operation. The mixed benchmarks show
a similar behavior: the higher the PUT ratio, the lower the throughput. Hence,
the MIX50 (50% PUT operations) has a lower average throughput than MIX20.
The DEL operation avoids any time intensive memory operation and only has to
free a data object after looking it up in the store. An interesting observation is
made when comparing the memory throughput of the benchmarks executed in
the REE against the benchmarks executed in the TEE. Key-value store oper-
ations executed inside TAs experience a 12×-14× overhead with QEMU and a
12×-17× overhead on the Raspberry Pi. This overhead is due to the world and
context switches associated to TA method invocations.
Network Bandwidth. This micro-benchmark compares the network through-
put measured with iperfTZ in Op-Tee to the network throughput measured
with iperf3 in Linux. We deploy both programs with the same set of param-
eters, i.e., 128KiB socket and dummy buffer sizes. Upon each iteration the bit
rate is doubled starting at 1Mbit/s to 512Mbit/s. It should be noticed that TAs
are by default limited to 1MiB of memory during runtime. For this reason we do
not allocate more than 512KiB for the dummy data on the TA’s heap. Linux has
two kernel parameters which limit the maximum size of read and write socket
buffers: /proc/sys/net/core/rmem_max and /proc/sys/net/core/wmem_max.
These kernel parameters controlling the socket buffer size limit can be changed
at runtime using sysctl, in order to allocate larger socket buffers.
iperfTZ is generally exceeding on both setups the network throughput of
iperf3. On the Raspberry Pi 3B we cannot observe any degradation of the net-
work throughput due to an overhead from frequent world switches. This result
does not come as a surprise. The memory bandwidth benchmark operates at
a throughput of several hundred MB/s, while the network bandwidth bench-
mark operates at about 10MB/s. There is a gap of one order of magnitude in
throughput between the two benchmarks, which we assume to be sufficient for
the overhead not to arise. However, on QEMU we observe a serious degrada-
tion of the network throughput, when trying to achieve Gbit/s bit rate with
Op-Tee. Remarkably, high throughput rates are strongly affected by the world
switching overhead, even degrading beyond unaffected throughput rates. Our
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Fig. 6: Energy consumption during TCP network throughput measurements. Bit
rates on the x-axis are given in logarithm to base 2.
measurements indicate that network throughput beyond 500Mbit/s is affected
by a 1.8× world switching overhead, almost halving the network throughput.
Energy. During the network bandwidth benchmark, we recorded the power
consumed by both setups. The LINDY iPower Control and the Alciom Power-
Spy2 both record the timestamp as Unix time in seconds and the instantaneous
power in watts. We use those units to execute a numerical integration over time
using the trapezoidal method to obtain the total energy consumed by both se-
tups during a benchmark run. Fig. 6 shows these results. The total energy on the
y-axis (in joule) is consumed by the device while executing a benchmark run for
a specific bit rate on the x-axis (as binary logarithmic scale in Mbit/s). On the
Raspberry Pi (Fig. 6a) we observe that before reaching saturation, iperfTZ is
consuming about 2 J (11%) more than iperf3. In the highly saturated range, the
energy doubles with the throughput. However, with QEMU (Fig. 6b), the energy
difference between the execution in the REE and the TEE is significant. Given
that QEMU is running on an energy-demanding and powerful server, iperfTZ
consumes about 173 J (36%) more before the overhead arises than iperf3 in
the REE. We can clearly attribute this additional energy consumption observed
on both setups to the execution of iperfTZ in the TEE. Certainly, the world
switching overhead also contributes to an increase of the energy consumption
with QEMU. By assuming a similar behavior for the energy consumption on
QEMU as in the saturated range on the Raspberry Pi, we obtain a 1.6× energy
overhead due to world switching.
7 Related Work
There exists a plethora of network benchmarking and tuning tools. We note that
the implementation of iperfTZ is heavily inspired by the well-known iperf
tool. In this sense, iperfTZ support a subset of its command-line parameters,
for instance to facilitate the execution of existing benchmarking suites.14
The ttcp (Test TCP) tool was one of first programs implemented to mea-
sure the network performance over TCP and UDP protocols. Lately, it has been
superseded by nuttcp.15 A tool with similar features is netperf.16 Unlike the
14 Full compatibility with iperf would require substantial engineering efforts that we
leave out of the scope of this work.
15 See footnote 6
16 See footnote 5
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aforementioned tools, tcpdump17 is a packet analyzer that captures TCP packets
being sent or received over a network. iperfTZ does not provide packet analysis
tools. Instead, it does offer client and server-side measurements both for TCP
and UDP datafows. More recently, iperf integrated most of the functionalities
of ttcp, extending it with multi-threading capabilities (since iperf v2.0) and
allowing bandwidth measurements of parallel streams. While it would be possi-
ble to provide similar support in iperfTZ, the execution of code inside the TAs
is currently single-threaded, hence limiting the achievable outbound throughput.
The most recent version of iperf (v3.0) ships a simplified (yet single-threaded)
implementation specifically targeting non-parallel streams. Flowgrind18 is a dis-
tributed TCP traffic generator. In contrast, iperfTZ follows a client-server
model, with traffic generated between a server and a TA. StreamBox-TZ [23] is
a stream analytics engine, which processes large IoT streams on the edge of the
cloud. The engine is shielded from untrusted software using TrustZone. Similar
to iperfTZ, StreamBox-TZ runs on top of Op-Tee in a TA. Yet, iperfTZ does
not process data streams but can generate and measure network performance of
those streams.
To summarize and to the best of our knowledge, iperfTZ is the first tool
specifically designed to run as a TA forTrustZone that can measure the achiev-
able network throughput for such applications.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
The deployment of TAs is becoming increasingly pervasive for the management
and processing of data over the network. However, due to constraints imposed
by the underlying hardware and runtime system, network performance of TAs
can be affected negatively. iperfTZ is a tool to measure and evaluate network
performance of TAs for Arm TrustZone, a widely available TEE on embed-
ded, IoT and mobile platforms. We implemented the iperfTZ prototype on top
of Op-Tee and we evaluated it on the Raspberry Pi platform. Our experimental
results highlight performance and energy trade-offs deployers and programmers
are confronted with both on hardware and emulated environments. We believe
the insights given by our work can be exploited to improve design and configu-
ration of TEEs for edge devices handling real-world workloads for TAs.
We intend to extend our work to support different types of sockets (e.g., data-
gram sockets) and to leverage on-chip cryptographic accelerators. This would
allow us to provide TLS-like channels for TAs, a feature that has not yet been
implemented in Op-Tee. Finally, we aim for supporting various kinds of TEEs,
especially in the context of embedded platforms and SoC, such as Keystone19
for RISC-V processors.
17 https://www.tcpdump.org, accessed on 30.07.2019
18 www.flowgrind.net, accessed on 30.07.2019
19 https://keystone-enclave.org, accessed on 30.07.2019
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